Here's Mike's original post, followed by our subsequent comments. Mike's writing is in italics; mine isn't.
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This is digusting. Seriously.
An Afghan student and journalist has been sentenced to death .
And what did Sayed Perwiz Kambakhsh do to deserve this punishment? He was, according to the BBC, “downloading material from the internet relating to the role of women in Islamic societies.”
This, according to the Afghan courts, is tantamount to blasphemy, which, naturally enough, is deserving of the death penalty.
77 Canadian lives (and thousands from other nations) have been lost during the war in Afghanistan, and for what? So that we could replace one batch of religious nutcases with another? ‘Enduring Freedom’, my ass. No party will get my vote in the next election unless it calls for a withdrawl from this mess.
Why must we keep humanity, which is capable of so much, captive in arms of religious myth? Wake up, folks. It’s the 21st century here. Religion is not harmless; it is a powerful weapon precisely because the vast, vast majority of the world’s inhabitants cannot see its inherent ridiculousness. People are dying today because of differing opinions about the invisible sky monster. As Sam Harris has put it, if people were killing over the relative superiority of Windows Vista vs. MacOS X, or Apples vs. Oranges, it would be no less ridiculous than the situation in which we find ourselves.
It’s all fun and games to laugh at the stupidity of creationists, or make light of the beliefs that keep certain people from eating certain meats, or from flicking a light switch on certain days of the week. While our collective intelligence may be insulted (and, in the case of the ridiculous notion of creationism/ID, collectively reduced) by these things, they, in and of themselves, do little harm.
But let us not forget that this sorry exhibition is what religion is really all about. When you believe, really truly believe, that the creator of the universe is insulted by certain web pages, and that the mere viewing of this material constitutes the highest form of insult to the diety, nothing can convince you otherwise. And until such time as we, as supposedly intelligent, secular countries are prepared to stop killing ourselves to defend this barbarism, we will never escape the claws of religion. Until we are able to say “religion is bunk, and here’s why”, we will never be truly free.
Religious moderates have no excuse. They facilitate this madness by asking; no, demanding that we give “respect” to their views on the creator of the universe. Enough is enough.
Religion. poisons. everything.
-----Mike, I think your position is unfair to most people of faith.
I think I know your argument: if we have to respect "moderate" faith, on what grounds can we refuse to respect "extremist" faith? Either we accept both or we reject both.
I disagree. First, I don't demand that anyone accept my faith as true. The only respect I ask is the freedom to practice my beliefs insofar as I don't impinge on the freedoms of others. You can offer me that kind of respect without accepting the truth of any religion.
Second, we can distinguish between tolerant and intolerant faiths. My faith demands that I not only tolerate, but actively *love*, those who disagree with me. Intolerant extremism is wholly incompatible with the Christianity that I follow. You can respect that faith and utterly reject someone else's intolerant beliefs.
So to call my faith the thin edge of an extremist wedge is not merely unfair; it's inaccurate. No extremist could hide behind the beliefs that I, and many others, espouse.
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Paul,
First let me say that I'm always happy when you respond to my postings. I know that your arguments will be intelligent and well-thought out. I don't always get that from some.
That having been said, I completely disagree with your sentiment, and here's why.
I recognize that you, as an individual, do not demand that I accept your faith as being literally true, in the sense that "Mike is currently in England" is true. I should state that I absolutely support the freedom of religion; the ability of people to practice whatever religion they wish, so long, as you say, that this practice does not impinge upon the ability of others to do likewise (or to practice no religion). I believe strongly that people should be free FROM discrimination based on religion (though I don't necessarily believe that they should be free TO do what ever their religion commands, simply because it commands it...everyone should have to wear a motorcycle helmet and no one should be able to bring a knife to school, for instance).
I disagree with your point about tolerant vs. intolerant faiths. While it is true that at this point in history certain religions pose a greater threat to humanity than others, we should be very careful to point out why that is. Jainism, for instance, poses very little threat to humanity, because, while Jains believe some improbable things about the nature of the universe (based on no evidence), there is no tenet of Jainism that dictates the killing of apostates, non-believers, or homosexuals. On the other hand, both Christianity and Islam have specific teachings that dictate that one or more specific group of people should be put to their death for what they do or do not believe or practice. Leviticus and Deuteronomy are chock full of the most horrid things you can imagine, the Koran and Hadith likewise.
Now, at this point in history, as I said, one might argue that Islam is by far the greater threat to humanity relative to Christianity. I would grant this, in part, but not completely. You must remember that Islam has not had its reformation (nor is it likely to); it remains virtually unchanged since its inception, mainly because the Koran is held to be the inerrant word of god. Certainly it doesn't take much to interpret a great deal of the Koran as being wholly incompatible with freedom in the Western sense of the word, and many have done just this. I would not wish to be a homosexual, apostate, or non-believer on the streets of Riyadh or Tehran. Of course, all of the Muslims I have ever encountered have been wonderful, peaceful people, though all have been encountered in the context of a country that does not tolerate intolerance, leading me to wonder what I would encounter should our surroundings change. But make no mistake, the gaping hole in Lower Manhattan was created solely by people who believed that their Tuesday morning deeds would land them a preferential place in heaven. They felled those buildings because of faith; no other reason.
Christianity, by contrast, HAS had its reformation, and has had its books subjected to interpretation. The vast majority of Christians I have encountered (such as yourself) have been peaceful, wonderful folks. Although I know that the vast majority of people on the streets of Toronto or any Western city believe in the divinity of Jesus, I do not feel in the least bit frightened of them as a vocal non-believer.
Why the difference between my opinions of Christianity and Islam? Is it because one is intrinsically more tolerant than the other, as you contend?
No.
It is because you and most Christians have recognized that a literal interpretation of your religion's teachings is wholly incompatible with modernity. The reason you don't keep slaves (as the NEW Testament expressly allows and which Jesus never forbids) is that you know keeping slaves is wrong. Your reasons for knowing that are not a product of your faith, but are concessions to secularism. The teachings of your religion are clear; I should be put to death for using the lord's name in vain, and a whole host of other crimes against god; slaves can be kept. But I dont fear these things from Christians because most (but not all) have agreed to put certain elements of their faith aside in the interest of getting along with others. Many Muslims have not yet done so. These concessions are, once again, to secularism, not to religion.
But, Christianity does not get a free pass. Thousands of people will die in sub-Saharan Africa TODAY because of what two Christian men (Joseph Ratzinger and George W. Bush) believe about what the creator of the universe thinks about placing a thin piece of latex over one's penis. Those people are dying needlessly because the Catholic Church and US evangelical protestants believe that the cure is worse than the disease, despite real honest evidence that condom use is far more effective at preventing HIV infection than abstinence programs alone. If 'love' were at the centre of it, these guys would be dropping condoms from planes. The fact that they are not suggests ulterior motives to their (in)actions
Moreover, millions of people will needlessly suffer or die because the Christian US government official opposes the study of 2-day old piles of embryonic stem cells. Why do they do this? Because they believe the creator of the universe has imparted some special entity to these cells that somehow makes them different than every other cell we routinely harvest for research.
What ties all of this together is faith; the belief in things without evidence. Faith is completely anathema to the progress of humanity. We are what we are today, in every sense, because people have based their beliefs about physical reality on evidence. Yes, most of the triumphs of humanity have been made by people of faith, but their triumphs were in no way dependent upon their faith (nor, for most of human history, did they have a choice of whether to be 'faithful' or not...just as much of the world has little choice today).
I am being fair to all people of faith. I am well aware that one cannot lump all believers into one category. The actions of fundamentalists and moderates are completely different, and we should judge the people accordingly. But it is faith that underlies all of it. And religious moderates, by demanding not that their faith be practiced by everyone but that their faith be RESPECTED simply because it is faith, who facilitate the fundamentalists. It should, quite frankly, be shameful to hold beliefs that are incongruent with evidence. The fact that religious faith is one of our most cherished virtues (and the fact that you are likely taken aback by my saying that religious faith should be shameful to hold) is a testament to just how messed up we are.
You should be free to believe what you wish (in the sense that you should have the right to believe what you want), of course, but I must also be free to say you are wrong. You are, however, not free to believe what you want about the meaning of the word "north", for instance (not, at least, if you want to be part of rational discourse). If you dispute what the evidence tells us about "north", you should expect not to be taken seriously. The same standard should apply when you dispute what the evidence tells us about, say, the age of the universe, the common descent of all living things, or whether it is possible to perform miracles, answer prayers, or rise from the dead. The fact that it is not is scary to me.
In closing, Paul, I hope you don't find my tone too abrasive. It is not the faithful I distain, but faith itself. We should be able to see the difference.
I should also state again that I very much appreciate our online discussions. While our opinions differ wildly, I find our discourse stimulating and just plain fun.
M
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Mike, I love our discussions too. Thanks for your thoughtful response.
I don't agree with your claim that my tolerance is a concession to modernity and a departure from Christianity, though. There's language in the Old Testament that I'm still coming to terms with, but the message of Jesus is pretty simple:
"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets."
One thing I love about Christianity is that it operates on first principles like this. I think that shows a respect for the human capacity to figure out the details on our own. But I digress. My point is: when God Himself says that we are to love Him and love others, and that the whole system of religion and law rests on those principles, anything incompatible with love is incompatible with our faith.
So while I can't speak for anyone else's faith, I can say this for mine: the tolerance and love that I try (not without frequent failure, mind you) to espouse is not a departure from my faith, it's the very core of it.
(As for slavery in the New Testament, Jesus doesn't expressly forbid it--but I think the first principles that He laid out, as quoted in my earlier comment, do a good enough job of that.)
I agree with you that there are dangerous people who do awful things because they think God wants them to. I think it's sick that Christian extremists push condom-free 'abstinence' programs in Africa, seemingly not caring about the fact that this policy leaves a whole continent open to the ravages of AIDS. My response is that these people are misguided. But that doesn't invalidate the faith itself; it just means some people are wrong.
Like I said, I don't demand that anyone respect my faith; I only ask for the right to practice it peacefully. That gives no shelter to extremists.
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Paul,
You can cherry pick the Bible all you want; catch Jesus in half his moods, and be certain that yours is a religion of love and tolerance. I have no doubt that you, personally, are full of love and tolerance.
But:
If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them. - Leviticus 20:13
But forasmuch as he had not to pay, his lord commanded him to be sold, and his wife, and children, and all that he had, and payment to be made. - Matthew 18:25
So while I have no doubt that the Golden Rule was a wonderful teaching (which existed long before Jesus), it's lines like this:
Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword. - Matthew 10:34
that make it hard to accept Christianity as a purely peaceful path. You can ignore these parts, but that's only because your secularism is winning out over your faith.
"Like I said, I don't demand that anyone respect my faith; I only ask for the right to practice it peacefully. That gives no shelter to extremists"
But once you allow for the premise of belief without evidence; once you say that it is acceptable, as part of our societal discourse, to hold beliefs based on faith, then you legitimize faith. The 9/11 attackers were, based on this argument, actually BETTER Muslims than most, because they truly followed what is written in their holy books.
I hold that it is this legitimization of faith that is the real problem. Once we allow faith a place of privilege, all interpretations are valid. Fundamentalism may be less palatable than moderatism, but it is not less 'correct' if we allow for faith on first principles.
I'm glad you disavow what's going on in Africa. But Paul, it is our consistent support of religious faith that makes things like that possible in the first place.
Imagine a world in which all beliefs scaled with evidence; in this world, people who held beliefs contrary to evidence would be asked "why do you believe this?", and be held to answer for those beliefs before actions could be taken based upon them. In this world, the sub-Saharan Africa problem would not exist, because no one would be able to claim 'faith' as a legitimate reason for doing anything. The current US policy on Africa (and stem-cell research) is based entirely on faith.
You may disagree with those policies and actively work to have them removed, and that's great. But their root cause, the life blood of those policies, is the acceptance of faith as a virtue. Faith is necessary and sufficient for those policies, and only by de-legitimizing faith can we improve things.
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It's not necessary to cherry-pick from the Bible to see Christianity as a peaceful, tolerant faith. The Leviticus line about stoning homosexuals is from the Old Testament. It was clearly superseded by Jesus' teaching: he once prevented a stoning by saying that he who was without sin should cast the first stone. (John 8:7)
The passage about the slave (Matthew 18:25) doesn't endorse slavery at all. It's from a parable decrying hypocrisy. The character in the story happens to be a slave, but there's nothing there suggesting that slavery is acceptable. Read the rest of the chapter; it'll be clear.
Likewise, Matthew 10:34 ("I came not to send peace, but a sword") should be read in context. This is a passage in which Jesus tells his followers that they may be rejected by their loved ones for following him, and that they should be willing to pay that price. He's not advocating actual violence.
Of course, I'm sure there are some people who read the section literally and commit violence in Jesus' name. But the only way to reconcile the line about swords (which could conceivably be read as metaphor) with the line about the golden rule (which cannot) is to infer that the line about swords does not advocate actual violence. Given that this is the only reading that makes sense when read as a whole, and that it doesn't strain credibility to read it this way, we can conclude that Jesus is not advocating actual violence here. That squares not only with the golden rule, but with the rest of the non-judgmental, non-violent philosophy that he preaches elsewhere in the New Testament.
That's not to say there aren't misguided, violent people who believe they're doing God's work. But there is at least one credible reading in which Christianity -- all of it -- espouses love without exception.
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Paul,
There is no question that Jesus is, by and large, an excellent individual upon which to begin to build a philosophy of relationships with others (his failure to disavow slavery in Luke, notwithstanding).
The same can be said for numerous others throughout history, of course. The only difference is that Jesus has been elevated o a somewhat higher state than, say, Gandhi or Plato.
If we could simply accept that the Bible is just a book, with some bits thrown out for good measure, we might be on to something. We've done this with stories about Zeus, Poseidon, and Ra, but we cannot yet do this with the Bible for some reason.
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Mike,
Here's my response to your second point:
"I hold that it is this legitimization of faith that is the real problem. Once we allow faith a place of privilege, all interpretations are valid. Fundamentalism may be less palatable than moderatism, but it is not less 'correct' is we allow for faith on first principles."
As I understand it, your argument is this: faith equals belief without evidence. Some people believe, without evidence, that God wants them to make bad moral choices (such as flying planes into buildings). If we accept that it's legitimate to espouse harmless beliefs without evidence, we have no basis on which to challenge beliefs that lead to harm. Whereas if all beliefs were evidence-based, there would obviously be no basis for harmful beliefs such as those held by religious terrorists.
We both believe that some moral choices (such as flying planes into buildings) are bad. But what is the basis for that belief? It's not evidence-based. This is a normative, not an empirical, issue. If we disavow any beliefs that are not evidence-based, I can't see any room for moral judgment at all.
In other words: you can only argue that non-empirical belief leads to 'bad' acts if you have a standard for defining what a 'bad' act is. As far as I can tell, that standard can't be empirical. Which means you need a non-empirical belief in order to justify your argument against non-empirical beliefs.
I'm not saying your moral standard has to be religious. I'm just saying that we all have non-empirical moral beliefs. The fact that some are both perverse and ostensibly religious doesn't mean that we should avoid non-empirical belief. I'm not even sure we *can* avoid it, unless we disavow morality altogether. But your argument against non-empirical belief is a moral argument.
It's also fair to point out that there are plenty of non-religious moral beliefs that are just as cruel as those espoused by religious extremists. Pol Pot, for example, fervently believed that it was moral to slaughter the educated classes in order to establish an agrarian paradise. That's a fanatical moral choice that had nothing to do with religious belief.
So I think the enemy here is not faith per se. As I hope I've demonstrated, every moral system involves faith, if we define faith as non-empirical belief. The enemy is moral systems that allow or encourage cruelty. I think the best answer is to espouse moral systems that embrace love.
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Paul,
We can be moral beings without accepting anything on insufficient evidence. My point is that those buildings were felled by people who honestly thought that the creator of the universe wanted it to be so.
The decision to act with some sense of 'morality', whatever the origins of that morality, need not come without some basis in evidence. We can provide ample evidence that slavery, for instance, is morally wrong because it produces genuine harm against other human beings. If we, at first principles, state that 'doing no harm' is our ultimate goal, then we must accept that slavery is wrong, irrespective of what the creator of the universe does or does not want.
I also dispute whether the actions of the 9/11 attackers represented real 'moral' choices per se. They were entirely moral actions, within the confines of what those 19 people believed to be ultimately moral; indeed, what they did was the height of morality in their eyes.
But once again, I believe firmly that we can be moral beings without accepting anything on insufficient evidence. Philosophy can teach us a great deal, and while my knowledge of philosophical principles is admittedly rudimentary, I know enough to understand that we can make moral and ethical choices that are not, in any way, based upon beliefs about things about which we manifestly do not, and often cannot know.
Morality, as you say, need not spring from religion; religion is neither necessary nor sufficient for morality.
In the final analysis, the difference here is this: you feel that faith, when applied according to moral principles (which can be had without faith), can lead to good. I do not dispute this in the least. My retort, however, is that it is faith, and faith alone (whether it be in a deity, in the case of religion, or in a cult of personality, as we saw throughout the 20th century), that inspires the worst in people.
Our human triumphs have resulted from letting what we DO follow from what we KNOW. All that you speak of; morality, love, peace, can be had without claiming to know anything we do not, and perhaps cannot, know.
Your Pol Pot reference is a standard canard. You might also have tried Hitler or Stalin; those work too.
The gas chambers and the gulag are not examples of what happens when we demand too much evidence for things; too much rationality. The Khmer Rouge, the Nazis, and Stalin-era Communists may have been atheistic, but they were as religious as the most devout church. They worshiped people and beliefs without evidence. They were as faith-based as any religion that has ever existed
Faith is merely a subset of the true evil; dogma.
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"
Only if we start with the principle that it's wrong to harm others. Which, in itself, is not an empirical claim. My point is that all morality starts with non-empirical first principles.
Pol Pot did terrible things because his first principles ("We should have an agrarian society at all costs") collided with his entirely empirical belief that he'd need to kill a lot of people to make it happen.
It wasn't faith that led Pol Pot to slaughter his people: it was the moral conviction that agrarianism is more important than human life. You're correct in noting that this moral conviction is a belief without proof, but so is my moral conviction that human life is more important than agrarianism. Same with your own moral standards. My point is that political and religious extremists aren't dangerous because their believe things that are unproven; they're dangerous because their morality values certain goals more than it values human life.
Moral behaviour is the product of two things: moral first principles (which are never empirical) and a belief about the state of the world (which is sometimes empirical). If I start with bad first principles, I'm going to do terrible things even if my belief about the state of the world is entirely rational. For example, I may believe that it's ok to kill people to achieve my political goals (a moral principle), and I may correctly observe that I can't achieve my political goals without killing anyone (an empirical fact). The problem here isn't irrationality; it's bad morals. That has nothing to do with faith.
It's unfair, then, to blame faith for this kind of fanatical violence. It's just as much a secular phenomenon as it is a religious one.
22 comments:
Paul,
Thanks for moving this thread over from Facebook; that was getting a little silly over there.
I will address your points re: morality and faith later today.
M
My point is that political and religious extremists aren't dangerous because their believe things that are unproven; they're dangerous because their morality values certain goals more than it values human life.
I will address the bulk of the post, but I thought I'd start with something that I almost agree with.
You're quite right; if we start with the first-principles axiom that human life should be valued above all else (which, as you are aware, is a notion that long-pre-dates Christianity), then the actions of Pol Pot/Hitler/et al can be seen as an empirical need to kill contrasting with a moral teaching that diverges from our axiom.
But I think your argument falls down when we consider that Pol Pot's "empirical" need to kill people to achieve his ends is really nothing more than a means to satisfy his faith in agrarianism. You will retort that my empirical need to not kill to achieve my ends is a means to satisfy my faith in valuing human life. Quite so.
But I think we're missing out on one key point here.
We can accept the golden rule as a foundation for morality not merely because we accept the golden rule as axiomatic (which I prefer in this case, to be distinguished from "faith", which I see as something different entirely), but because we know what human suffering is. That is, we have empirical (and first-hand) evidence that (a) human suffering exists and (b) that it is undesirable.
The golden rule exists because the human condition tells us (empirically) that suffering is bad.
Thus, the notion that "do no harm" is a faith-based (or axiomatic) position, while valid in a purely 'dictionary' sense of the word faith, falls apart, I think, when we consider why we hold this view.
By contrast, it takes an entirely different set of "axioms" to accept that Mohammed ascended to heaven on a winged horse. IF we knew that winged horses existed, and IF we knew that heaven existed, then it would still be axiomatic to believe that Mohammed ascended to heaven on a winged horse (since we have no evidence of it, other than the reference to it in the Koran), but at least we would be in a similar position to that which you described re: morality. If we knew these things (the existence of winged horses and heaven), then the believe that Mohammed ascended to heaven on a winged horse would be reasonable; it may or may not be true, and one could hold a discussion of the evidence, but at least there would be an a priori reason to think it MAY be true.
So the summary of my point is this: we hold a moral position of "do no harm" not merely because we accept this premise based on 'faith', but because we have evidence that human suffering exists and is not pleasant; morality, in this case, becomes the conclusion, rather than the axiom. This is in no way comparable to the faith required to believe things for which no evidence exists.
Mike,
I take your point that we know empirically that suffering exists and that it is unenjoyable. But I'm not sure it explains the golden rule.
Our knowledge of suffering gets us to the point of seeking to avoid pain in ourselves (and possibly in people we profess to care about), based on pure self-interest. But we don't merely believe that we should avoid pain simply because we don't like it: we believe in a moral duty not to inflict it on others, even on those we dislike. We probably believe that there are times when we should even endure pain ourselves in order to spare others. The mere knowledge that pain is unpleasant doesn't explain our conviction that it's wrong to cause it in others. Nor does it explain our belief that it's sometimes right to endure it in ourselves.
Our knowledge of pain does contribute to our belief that we shouldn't induce it: if we didn't think pain was unpleasant, we wouldn't think it was bad to inflict it, because we wouldn't think we were making anyone else suffer. But what causes our belief that it's wrong to make others suffer? That belief is axiomatic.
You might reply that altruism is an evolutionary trait. Maybe: but if it's merely a tool for self-propagation of the species, then it has no real moral force. It's purely utilitarian, a tool for ensuring the survival of the species. If so, it's morally neutral. (Unless you attach any moral significance to the continuation of the species: but if so, you'll have to explain where that moral significance came from.)
It may be that our sense of morality is purely an evolutionary trait, but if so, we'll have to acknowledge that morality is an illusion: we can judge actions as more or less likely to achieve the goal of the propagation of the species, but without an underlying sense of morality that can't be explained by its evolutionary usefulness, we can't declare the propagation of the species to be either "good" or "bad."
But I'm digressing a bit here. My argument remains that there are no moral positions that are fully empirical. All moral claims rest on axioms which cannot be explained solely by reference to evidence and logic.
Your "9/11 argument" against faith concludes that 9/11s are bad, and we wouldn't have them if all our actions were empirically based. But "9/11s are bad" is a moral argument. And if I understand you correctly, you define faith as belief in what is not (or cannot?) be proven. That definition includes first-principles moral axioms.
My ultimate point is that your argument against axiomatic belief relies on an axiomatic belief.
Two more things:
1) You say that you see faith and axiomatic belief as entirely different. Can you expand on this?
2) You mentioned that the notion of valuing human life above all else pre-dates Christianity. This is probably true, but I wonder if you mean to imply that this diminishes Christianity's claim to truth.
If not, forgive me for putting words in your mouth. But if so, I should point out that Christianity can be true even if not all of its tenets are unique to it. As C.S. Lewis noted, "we are not pronouncing all other religions to be totally false, but rather saying that in Christ whatever is true in all religions is consummated and perfected." If Christianity actually represents a universally valid truth, we should expect some non-Christians and pre-Christians to have arrived at some of the same ideas independently.
Paul,
There is no way of getting around your point that all things are, at their root, axiomatic. I have conceded this, with respect even to science, at the following posts:
http://propterhoc.wordpress.com/2007/05/17/fundamentalist-science/
and
http://propterhoc.wordpress.com/2007/05/24/fundamentalist-sciencepart-deux/
I readily accept this. However, it is my central point that the axioms underlying morality or science are in no way comparable to that required for religious faith.
Science relies upon two axioms; that there is an objective reality, and that past observations are predictive of future observations. With those two axioms in hand, all else follows from a rational approach. And I've made the case on my blog posts that even these axioms are not really all that axiomatic. For one, the latter axiom, that past observations provide predictive power, is covered by falsifiability; every time we heat water, it boils at 100C, so we say that the boiling point of water is 100C. This is true because it has been true every time we've done the experiment. If tomorrow water boils at 105C, then we must reconcile it with the current theory (e.g. was there experimental error? Was the air pressure different? Or was our theory wrong?). In this case, it is highly unlikely that water will be found to boil at any other temperature, because the body of evidence supporting this observation is vast (think I'll make some tea this morning).
The second scientific axiom is more difficult. There may not be an objective reality; this all may be an illusion; you may see green the way I see red. But I argue that we have no evidence for this alternative, and we can quite clearly state that the world is not functionally subjective; when asked to pick out the red car, we both choose the same one.
Morality is an evolutionary trait, but it is not an illusion, any more than opposable thumbs are an illusion. If you have not done so, and are interested in the evolution of morality and altruism, then I suggest you read "The Selfish Gene" by Richard Dawkins; it's his first book, published in the mid-70s, and is truly excellent in this regard.
Once again, however, religious faith is in no way comparable to this. Religious faith relies upon first principles which are demonstrably contrary to facts which have been derived from logic, reason, and empirical evidence. If the Bible said that Jesus could make pure water boil at 50C at 1 atm of pressure, that would, likewise, be a statement that is contrary to what science tells us is true. Young Earth Creationists argue that the reason stars LOOK so old is that the speed of light was much faster 6000 years ago (when the universe was created), and so the light has reached us much faster than experiment and observation tells us. To equate this type of "faith" with the axioms required for science and/or morality is, I'm afraid, disingenuous; it's trying to legitimize a belief that has no basis in reality by denigrating the meaning of "real".
I appreciate that you do no share the beliefs of Young Earth Creationists in this regard, but your holy book, to name but one example, is chock full of these types of digressions from evidence, reason, logic, and sometimes sense itself.
So 'faith' and 'axiom' can very easily be distinguished. All things must rest upon initial assumptions; assumptions which can be tested against reality, and then discarded if need be. When was the last time that anyone said "perhaps we should test whether water really can be turned to wine"? Once you are prepared to subject your faith to this kind of rigour, you will join the ranks of the rational in this regard. Otherwise, there truly is no distinguishing characteristic between the faiths. One may (or may not, indeed) be more tolerable in the immediate future, but all faiths rely upon the same ignorance of reason.
The fact that the golden rule predates Christianity is merely to point out that Christianity did not invent morality. Christianity's claim to truth is not diminished by this; it's (often made, despite C.S. Lewis) claim to being the sole path to truth and goodness is diminished. Clearly a belief in the divinity of Jesus is not a requirement for living a good life (the Good Samaritan, by way of example, was, by first principles, not a Christian). Christianity's claim to being literally true does not hinge upon it having invented the golden rule or not; Jesus could have invented it (which would have made him a much better role model than he currently stands), and still not have been the son of god.
Paul,
I will leave you with a question.
Notwithstanding this discussion of morality, is there a first-principles reason why one must hold a belief in god? Is it disbelief that natural forces, despite vast evidence to the contrary, could have created this universe, this planet, and life on it?
Or is there some other a priori reason for faith? My own belief is that it is generally something that is simply passed from generation to generation, like political beliefs or sports team alliances often are. It may or may not have evolutionary explanations for populations, but I'm curious as to why individuals choose to believe. To me, there simply is no good reason even to have religious faith in the first place; no reason for humans to ever have invented it, except plain old ignorance of facts. So I wonder why it persists.
Just curious.
Mike,
Thanks as always for your thoughtful comments.
If I understand you correctly, you distinguish between "religious faith" and "axiomatic belief" on the grounds that religious faith = acceptance of unproven claims about fact, while "axiomatic belief" = acceptance of unproveable principles. In other words, religious faith involves belief in unproven positive claims, while axiomatic belief involves acceptance of unproveable normative claims. Am I right so far?
If so, then I see us as having at least two debates. The first involves your argument that we can only avoid future 9/11s by accepting only rational conclusions and proven facts. I disagree, for the reasons I've already outlined: all moral claims are axiomatic, so even if my facts are correct and my reasoning perfectly rational, I may simply believe that it's ok to blow up buildings in pursuit of my own ends.
To my knowledge, the only people who believe in purely and literally factual moral claims are theists. Unless one admits the existence of factual moral claims, we're stuck in the realm of the unproaxiomatic. So we can't prescribe pure fact-and-rationality-driven behaviour as the cure for bad acts. Our very ability to describe certain behaviours as "bad" rests on a value system that is not purely fact-and-rationality-driven.
I believe that takes care of the first argument. But I'll take it a step further: if there is objective truth to morality, where does it come from? I maintain that if the moral impulse can be fully explained as an evolutionary trait, then it's nonsensical to believe that moral claims can describe anything as actually "good" or "bad." They can only describe things in terms of whether they will help or hinder the propagation of the species. But if we abstract one level and say that something is "good" if it helps maintain the species, we need some authority for the claim that the survival of the species is, in fact, "good." Which brings us back to square one.
I suspect you've done more reading on the subject than I have, so I'd be curious to hear your thoughts.
Those are my thoughts on our argument about morality and axiomatic belief. I'll post my thoughts on our other argument--dealing with religious beliefs about factual claims--in a separate comment.
You're right to point out that religions make claims about facts. I believe certain historical claims about the life of Jesus (e.g. He was born roughly 2000 years ago in modern-day Israel; He said what he is quoted as saying in the Gospels; He walked on water; He was crucified; He rose from the dead); certain theological claims about the nature of God (e.g. He is a tripartite being of infinite goodness and ability, with a particular interest in the fate and ultimate well-being of humankind); and certain related claims about the nature of the universe (e.g. that it was created by God in roughly the manner outlined in Genesis 1).
You quite fairly ask what reasons support these beliefs. That's a long subject, and it's one in which I'm not as well-versed as certain other points of theology. Having been raised as a Christian, I didn't start from a position of non-belief and work my way from there through a series of positive proofs. I have seriously considered everything I've heard on the subject of whether God (and specifically the Christian God) exists, and I've never heard anything that was incompatible with my beliefs. So to that extent, my beliefs are not irrational: they've never been contradicted by anything else I've seen, and I haven't been avoiding the subject. That, quite understandably, will not be enough to convince you of the truth of my beliefs, but it's an explanation for why your ultimate question--what's the evidence to begin with?--hasn't been a big focus for me. I started from a position of belief and have never found a reason not to believe; you're in a position of non-belief and have never found a reason to believe.
I may be selling myself short here, though: I don't want to give the impression that I've never seen evidence or encountered what I believe to be valid, reasoned arguments that support my beliefs. I have. I just haven't made them a primary focus: there's not much value wallowing in evidence that merely confirms the rightness of one's existing position. Unless one is trying to win an argument, of course. Which I'm presently trying to do. So I'll be going back to that material in greater detail for the purposes of our discussions.
But enough about me. I mentioned a couple of paragraphs ago that you and I are starting from different positions in this discussion: me from the belief that God exists until I have reason to believe otherwise, and you from the belief that God does not. Which raises an issue: reading between the lines of your posts, I suspect that, all other things being equal, you consider your hypothesis to be a more valid starting position than mine. Why?
For example, you wrote earlier:
Religious faith relies upon first principles which are demonstrably contrary to facts which have been derived from logic, reason, and empirical evidence.
What article of faith relies on any principle that is demonstrably contrary to logic, reason or evidence? I'm not aware of any. We've got another debate going on miracles, for example, but I think we're agreed that science is the study of the natural, whereas miracles (if they occur) are by definition supernatural phenomena. There is no empirical evidence against them. I imagine you'll accuse me of trying to make you prove a negative, but when you argue that religious belief is demonstrably contrary to the evidence, that's the position you put yourself in.
Likewise, I don't see how belief in the supernatural is contrary to logic or reason. We have no evidence (of which I'm aware) that the supernatural doesn't exist, and some evidence (in the form of historical testimony, eyewitness accounts, personal experiences of the numinous, etc.) that it does. You and I would probably disagree about the probative value of that evidence, but given that there exists some evidence for the supernatural and no evidence against it, I can't see why materialism is any more likely to be a true hypothesis than is theism.
My point here is that I suspect many atheists believe, however unconsciously, that materialism is the baseline and that theism is a hypothesis added onto it. This isn't accurate. The proposition that there is no supernatural is as much of a hypothesis as the proposition that there is. The true neutral position is one of curious agnosticism; the burden rests on each of us equally to move the ball in either direction from there.
You may raise Bertrand Russell's Celestial Teapot argument as a reply. I would have to call foul: I think that argument was unworthy of Russell. I accept the point that to baldly assert something does not make it probable. But the celestial teapot argument implies that a) there is nothing but bald assertion behind the notion that there is a God; b) we have some evidence that would lead us not to believe; and c) both the belief in God and the belief in a celestial teapot are equally silly. The fact that these assertions are implicit rather than explicit suggests that Russell was not fighting fair when he came up with the analogy. So let's pick apart those assumptions:
a) There is nothing but bald assertion behind the notion that the universe may have been created:
This isn't true. As I mentioned above, there is corroborrated eyewitness testimony about certain acts of Jesus (and, in the Old Testament, acs of God the Father, angels, and other supernatural beings) that could support the belief that God exists. We can debate the historical value of the evidence, but there is some evidence. (I'd also note that, when we do get around to debating the strength of the evidence, any argument that the stories are inherently improbable because they involve supernatural acts would be question-begging.) Conversely, there is no evidence of any otherworldly teapot.
b) We have some evidence that would lead us not to believe:
In the teapot example, we've got an object made of physical matter that has nevertheless been undetected by very reliable devices that we would expect to detect such things. That's evidence against the existence of the teapot. We have no devices that we would expect to be able to detect God. I don't claim that this makes God's existence more probable: but it makes the teapot a flawed analogy. And it's not a trivial flaw; it suggests a form of evidence against God's existence, when such evidence does not exist.
(You might find it suspiciously convenient that God, unlike matter, is not physical and is therefore undetectable by physical means. This would be an unfair criticism. Given that every theology of which I'm aware describes God as having created the physical universe, it would make no sense for theists to conceive of God as anything other than metaphysical. It seems far more likely that this, and not a disingenous wish to dodge the problem of God's apparent unobservability, is the reason God is described as metaphysical. Note also that the theories on the metaphysical nature of God predate the scientific method and therefore existed before they were rhetorically useful. This makes it that much less likely that they were cooked up in order to avoid an intellectual problem that the early theologists probably wouldn't have anticipated.)
c) Both the belief in God and the belief in a celestial teapot are equally silly:
The idea of a tiny teapot orbiting the sun is deliberately absurd and is designed to quietly provoke the notion that the idea of a creative force is equally silly. It was beneath a genius like Russell to insert an unstated premise into his argument and hope that people would swallow it without analysis.
Apologies if I've just spent several hundred words debunking an argument you weren't planning to raise. My central argument is this: before we get into the evidence for God's existence, we need to define the starting line. If you're beginning from the premise that any evidence of the supernatural is inherently improbable, then we're starting from a question-begging position.
Rather, I think the true starting line should be the position that, absent any evidence to the contrary, supernaturalism is just as likely a hypothesis as materialism. This, of course, makes my argument a little easier, because I'm not trying to prove a negative--but the nature of my position is that, unlike the atheist position, I don't have to.
If I understand you correctly, you distinguish between "religious faith" and "axiomatic belief" on the grounds that religious faith = acceptance of unproven claims about fact, while "axiomatic belief" = acceptance of unproveable principles. In other words, religious faith involves belief in unproven positive claims, while axiomatic belief involves acceptance of unproveable normative claims. Am I right so far?
I would say this is mostly accurate. What I'm trying to assert is that religious faith is (a) no different than any other dogma and (b) in no way comparable to those axioms that underlie, for instance, the scientific method. I willingly admit the need to accept some things on first principles. It is the ability (and willingness) to falsify that, in large part, set apart the axioms of science from religious faith and other dogmas.
If so, then I see us as having at least two debates. The first involves your argument that we can only avoid future 9/11s by accepting only rational conclusions and proven facts. I disagree, for the reasons I've already outlined: all moral claims are axiomatic, so even if my facts are correct and my reasoning perfectly rational, I may simply believe that it's ok to blow up buildings in pursuit of my own ends.
I disagree with the notion that morality is axiomatic, as you know, but I do take it on first principles that our principle moral concern should be to other human beings; that the concern for humanity should trump all else.
With respect to 9/11 itself (and the multitude of faith-inspired horrors that have taken place since then), we must take the hijackers and terrorists at their word: they did these things because they believe these things are the will of god. The actions have nothing at all to do with politics or mistreatment at the hands of the US or anyone else; if this were the case, if mistreatment of Muslims were really at the heart of Islamic terrorism, then the most likely target would have been Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which was responsible for the deaths of more Muslims than any regime in history.
So it is completely erroneous to think that 9/11 was a means to a political end. It was simply the end result of "perfect" religious faith, and we know this because the terrorists said so.
I should also point out that this is precisely why Islam is by far a greater threat to humanity than any other faith. That should not, however, be taken as a free pass to Christianity or any other faith. It is simple pragmatism; Christian faith is as irrational as Muslim faith. But Christians have learned that a literal interpretation of the "morality" described by Yahweh is incompatible with 21st century morality (or even 17th century morality).
To my knowledge, the only people who believe in purely and literally factual moral claims are theists.
And what a shame that the practice of this morality is so poor.
The moral claims as theists are "factual" if, and only if, you accept that they were created by god, which, of course, requires you accept the existence of god. If god does not exist, and I, as an atheist, am moral, then god is not required for morality. Add to this the superior (or at least equivalent) morality (rates of murder, rape, burglary, etc) of strongly secular countries (such as Sweden, Finland, Canada, etc) relative to strongly theist areas (the Islamic world, the "red" states, etc), and the argument that theism is necessary or sufficient for morality is demolished. QED.
So we can't prescribe pure fact-and-rationality-driven behaviour as the cure for bad acts. Our very ability to describe certain behaviours as "bad" rests on a value system that is not purely fact-and-rationality-driven.
I dont claim that frank empiricism is the answer to our moral questions. Moral philosophy is an active field of inquiry; Daniel Dennett has written volumes on moral philosophy and the evolution of morality. But the great thing about moral philosophy is that is does not require accepting one single thing on insufficient evidence.
Morality need not derive from empiricism, per se. I accept, axiomatically, that the concerns of humanity should trump all. Even if Allah was proven to exist, it would still be wrong to stone homosexuals or murder apostates.
You're quite right that my morality begins with the non-empirical assertion that not harming human beings is the ultimate "good" behaviour, and that any deviations from this point of view require vast amounts of high quality evidence. Religious faith (and other dogmas) replace this with the notion that there is a supernatural god that values other things more than humanity; I simply ask that the evidence be provided for this.
I maintain that if the moral impulse can be fully explained as an evolutionary trait, then it's nonsensical to believe that moral claims can describe anything as actually "good" or "bad."
I agree.
In the same way that a particular mutation may give rise to a trait that is evolutionarily advantageous under certain selection pressures and disadvantageous under others (thus negating the notion of "good" or "bad" mutations), the same can be said of moral behaviour, which, I contend, is merely an extension of altruism, which is predicted by the theory of evolution.
So our morality is no different than our opposable thumbs; neither good nor bad, just well adapted for the current set of selection pressures.
But if we abstract one level and say that something is "good" if it helps maintain the species, we need some authority for the claim that the survival of the species is, in fact, "good." Which brings us back to square one.
Survival isn't "good" or "bad". Altruism is "good" from the standpoint of the selfish gene; altruism helps to ensure that a particular gene will be replicated more frequently than other genes, although even this is too simplistic, since genes operate in groups, and thus cooperate with other genes.
But the survival of the species is simply a consequence of the survival of a specific set of genes. It is like saying "we need a higher authority to tell us that gravity is 'good'"; we don't. Gravity just "is", as survival just "is". It so happens that altruism, and consequently morality, is good for species survival, and so it exists.
More to come in the next post...
I believe certain historical claims about the life of Jesus (e.g. He was born roughly 2000 years ago in modern-day Israel; He said what he is quoted as saying in the Gospels; He walked on water; He was crucified; He rose from the dead); certain theological claims about the nature of God (e.g. He is a tripartite being of infinite goodness and ability, with a particular interest in the fate and ultimate well-being of humankind); and certain related claims about the nature of the universe (e.g. that it was created by God in roughly the manner outlined in Genesis 1).
Good to get that cleared up. You'd be surprised how many theists, when confronted with the lunacy of many of their core beliefs, retreat into a "god is love" type of position. Good to know that there will be no moving of the proverbial goalposts here.
Having been raised as a Christian, I didn't start from a position of non-belief and work my way from there through a series of positive proofs.
You were raised a Christian because at some point your parents, or your parents parents, or their parents before them, were convinced by someone else that Jesus is the son of god. Even without knowing your family, I can state that this is literally the long and short of it. The acceptance of the rest of it is shoehorning the irrational (and often patently false) notions of the bible into this belief. You accept the conclusion first, and then go about rationalizing the rest.
I'm quite sure you didn't start out with non-belief and then convince yourself otherwise; very few people do. In fact, most people who engage in this type of thing go the other way.
So to that extent, my beliefs are not irrational: they've never been contradicted by anything else I've seen, and I haven't been avoiding the subject. That, quite understandably, will not be enough to convince you of the truth of my beliefs, but it's an explanation for why your ultimate question--what's the evidence to begin with?--hasn't been a big focus for me.
That's fair enough, and it is not surprising. If I was going to structure my life around something as fundamental as belief in a particular diety (and all of the things than come with this), I would ask "how do I know this is true?"
You could honestly ask, why are you not a Muslim? The answer is, of course, that you are not a Muslim because your parents were not Muslim. If you are willing to accept such a low standard of evidence (or, indeed, not require evidence at all), then why Jesus? It still boils down to the incredible accident of your birth.
I started from a position of belief and have never found a reason not to believe; you're in a position of non-belief and have never found a reason to believe.
But, Paul, it is not a zero sum proposition; you and I may both be wrong. Of course, given the infinite number of possible gods, it is far more likely that you are wrong than that you are right. That is, unless you had some evidence that you, alone, are correct. But you've already conceded that evidence is of minimal importance to you.
I, on the other hand, have looked closely at the void of evidence, and taken the only logical position one can take; in the absence of evidence, one must disbelieve, until such time as suitable evidence is proffered. Once again, it should not be difficult for your omnipotent, omniscient god to provide some evidence of his existence.
My point here is that I suspect many atheists believe, however unconsciously, that materialism is the baseline and that theism is a hypothesis added onto it. This isn't accurate. The proposition that there is no supernatural is as much of a hypothesis as the proposition that there is. The true neutral position is one of curious agnosticism; the burden rests on each of us equally to move the ball in either direction from there.
Yes, but let us be clear that our agnosticism toward Yahweh is the same agnosticism we show toward Zeus and Allah and Ra and Thor.
Naturalistic science holds one massive trump card over supernaturalism; it works. It makes predictions, which can be validated by independent observers, using independent means. A universe devoid of supernatural intervention would, I think, look a whole lot like the one in which we currently reside.
So yes, the appropriate stance is one of agnosticism; I cannot state that Yahweh does not exist, just as I cannot state that Zeus does not exist.
ou may raise Bertrand Russell's Celestial Teapot argument as a reply. I would have to call foul: I think that argument was unworthy of Russell. I accept the point that to baldly assert something does not make it probable. But the celestial teapot argument implies that a) there is nothing but bald assertion behind the notion that there is a God; b) we have some evidence that would lead us not to believe; and c) both the belief in God and the belief in a celestial teapot are equally silly.
The Celestial Teapot analogy is used only to show that one cannot prove a negative. It is used when the theist says "well, you can't prove god doesn't exist". It is not used to state that the existence of a celestial teapot is likely, but merely that it cannot be disproven.
The Flying Spaghetti Monster is a much better way of looking at the issue.
a) There is nothing but bald assertion behind the notion that the universe may have been created:
This isn't true. As I mentioned above, there is corroborrated eyewitness testimony about certain acts of Jesus (and, in the Old Testament, acs of God the Father, angels, and other supernatural beings) that could support the belief that God exists. We can debate the historical value of the evidence, but there is some evidence. (I'd also note that, when we do get around to debating the strength of the evidence, any argument that the stories are inherently improbable because they involve supernatural acts would be question-begging.) Conversely, there is no evidence of any otherworldly teapot.
There is also anecdotal evidence that homeopathy and acupuncture are effective therapeutics; all of the properly controlled evidence suggests otherwise.
So anecdote gets us nowhere. Too much likelihood of theological 'placebo' effect.
b) We have some evidence that would lead us not to believe:
In the teapot example, we've got an object made of physical matter that has nevertheless been undetected by very reliable devices that we would expect to detect such things. That's evidence against the existence of the teapot. We have no devices that we would expect to be able to detect God.
Disagree; the teapot is too small to be seen, even with our most powerful telescopes. It's also made of a very special type of porcelain that makes it highly transparent.
Moreover, as I've mentioned, Jesus makes strong statements about the relationship between god and humans through prayer. He is quite clear that all prayers made by honest believers will be answered; mountains will move, he states. There is no reason to think this is metaphorical. The fact that mountains cannot move (and limbs cannot regrow) is evidence against the Christian god.
(You might find it suspiciously convenient that God, unlike matter, is not physical and is therefore undetectable by physical means. This would be an unfair criticism. Given that every theology of which I'm aware describes God as having created the physical universe, it would make no sense for theists to conceive of God as anything other than metaphysical.
Yup, it is convenient that you get to assert, by fiat, whatever you like about the nature of an invisible creature. The fact is, your god interacts directly with the physical world, and this should be detectable through the normal means. The fact that it is not is evidence against this claim. Even if we forget about the anecdote describing "supernatural" phenomenon, we must admit that your god is not generally in the business of regularly showing himself. It's almost as if he doesn't exist.
c) Both the belief in God and the belief in a celestial teapot are equally silly:
The idea of a tiny teapot orbiting the sun is deliberately absurd and is designed to quietly provoke the notion that the idea of a creative force is equally silly. It was beneath a genius like Russell to insert an unstated premise into his argument and hope that people would swallow it without analysis.
Paul, a man born of a virgin, who walks on water and is resurrected after his death by crucifixion is as silly as the notion that there is a fat man in a red suit who lives at the North Pole and delivers toys to billions of children every December 25th, and as silly as the notion that another man, who had a 9 year old bride and spoke to god through an angel that visited his cave, ascended to heaven on a winged horse.
They are all equally silly stories, and given the absence of evidence for all of them, we should cast them aside as ridiculous fables; not completely without merit, of course, but no more an accurate description of reality as are fairies at the bottom of the garden.
More to come...
What article of faith relies on any principle that is demonstrably contrary to logic, reason or evidence? I'm not aware of any.
The flood of Genesis.
This is completely at odds with reality; a physical impossibility.
Salt water or fresh? Either way, you kill half of all fish.
Where did the water go? The volume of water in the the Earth and its atmosphere is insufficient to flood the "high mountains under the entire heaven" (Gen 7:19); Everest is 29048 feet high; almost 9 kilometers above sea level!
If one believes in the flood, that person has a serious dispute with reality.
Oh, and lets not forget that Noah, at the time of the flood, was over 600 years old, though even this was young by OT standards!
Don't believe in the flood or ridiculous lifespans? Congratulations, you've just made a concession to secularism.
Frankly, just about all of Genesis is like this. It takes a vast amount of mental gymnastics to reconcile god creating humans de novo with 4.5 billion years of demonstrably true (meaning consistent with and predicted by evidence) common descent.
How do you reconcile the fact that human beings and willow trees are the product of an identical process of evolution (from the same common ancestor, which lived about 1-2 billion years ago), and yet somehow human beings are special? There is no a priori reason why human beings (or willow trees) should have emerged from evolution. They did so because of the specific set of non-random selection pressures that acted upon the random mutation available in the population of pre-humans and pre-willow trees. I cannot for the life of me see how Genesis is consistent with this, except in the very broadest terms imaginable (something similar would be: special relativity is consistent with my ability to see light).
We've got another debate going on miracles, for example, but I think we're agreed that science is the study of the natural, whereas miracles (if they occur) are by definition supernatural phenomena. There is no empirical evidence against them. I imagine you'll accuse me of trying to make you prove a negative, but when you argue that religious belief is demonstrably contrary to the evidence, that's the position you put yourself in.
Prayers, Paul, prayers! Show me the evidence that prayer works; show me the evidence that prayer improves outcomes for heart patients, or cancer patients, or increases the likelihood of France winning Euro 2008. Show me that evidence, and all is forgotten. Jesus makes this VERY clear; honest prayers will be answered. Not in some metaphorical "I-know-better-what-is-REALLY-good-for-you" kind of way, but in the "you asked for a new arm, and here's your new arm" kind of way.
THAT is evidence, Paul; not someone's mother's mother's mother telling you that a person she used to know 10 years ago had a cousin that prayed for his toenail cancer to be cured and it was; that's not what the bible describes. I don't need to prove a negative at all; you're making the positive claim here; you're stating that the supernatural, as it is described in the bible (and in particular as described in the NT) is a real force at work in the universe. So show it to me; I can even describe the study for you: find 1000 believers (you can pick them to be sure that they are 'honest'...truly pious); randomize them into the following groups: (1) pray for a specific outcome for a group of heart surgery patients and tell the patients they're being prayed for, (2) don't pray for the patients and tell them they're not being prayed for, (3) pray for them and don't tell them they're being prayed for, (4) don't pray and don't tell. Then see if outcomes are different.
Luckily, this has already been done!
Harris, W. S., Gowda, M., Kolb, J. W., Strychacz, C. P., Vacek, J. L., Jones, P. G., Forker, A., O'Keefe, J. H., and McCallister, B. D. A randomized, controlled trial of the effects of remote, intercessory prayer on outcomes in patients admitted to the coronary care unit. Arch Intern.Med 10-25-1999;159(19):2273-2278.
The results? People being prayed for did no better than those not being prayed for. And those being prayed for who knew they were being prayed for actually did worse than those who didn't know they were being prayed for. Performance anxiety?
The point is, whatever the "mechanism" through which prayer allegedly works, there is simply no evidence that it does work. If it did, this test should show that; it doesn't, and this is evidence of absence.
given that there exists some evidence for the supernatural and no evidence against it, I can't see why materialism is any more likely to be a true hypothesis than is theism.
I've been over the enormous issues with all anecdotal evidence, and I think, after 2000 years, the absence of direct evidence (especially in the last 250 or so years, since the development of proper scientific methods) is telling. A universe where god exists would look very different than the one in which we reside; for one, the effects of the supernatural would be visible and amenable to measurement. The fact that it is not (again, unless you can point me to properly controlled evidence to the contrary) is evidence against the notion.
How Genesis might have sounded, had god existed:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4qymoktf0wY&e
This would have been a Genesis that is entirely consistent with modern science, requiring no metaphor or rationalization of patently false statements.
Mike,
You argue that the flood didn't happen on the grounds that such a flood apparently could not naturally occur. Where would the water come from? Where did it go? We don't (and perhaps never could) have a good explanation for how this could naturally occur.
But no one asserts that the flood was a natural occurrence. Atheists claim that it didn't happen; theists claim that if it happened at all, it was a product of God's intervention in the world. The claim is that the flood was a supernatural occurrence. I don't know where the water came from or where it went. If God had to personally step in to make the flood happen, then of course we wouldn't expect it to be naturally possible: otherwise it would have happened without God's intervention. When God directly intervenes in the world, we should expect results that differ from what would naturally occur; otherwise there would be no need for intervention. The logical consequence of this is that, if God finds it necessary to intervene directly in order to produce some result, we should expect the result to be naturally impossible (or at least highly unlikely). In fact, I imagine that if there were a plausible natural explanation for the biblical flood, you would use this as evidence that it was merely natural and not the work of God. Since there is no natural explanation (that we know of), you use this as evidence that it didn't happen. You see where this leads? If it's natural, it wasn't a miracle; if it's unnatural, it didn't happen. Why? Because you presuppose a naturalist viewpoint that excludes all possibility of the supernatural.
Your argument boils down to a claim that a supernatural event could not have happened because it could not have happened naturally.
This begs the question. If you claim that the supernatural is impossible because it isn't natural, you're beginning with the premise that anything other than the natural is impossible. Your argument, then, is that there is no supernatural because there is only the natural. In other words, you start with the premise that the supernatural is impossible, and use this as evidence that the supernatural is impossible.
Your argument, then, is circular.
Mike,
Thanks for your detailed replies. I think we're getting down to business here.
I don't have time for a detailed reply tonight, but I think your argument about Jesus' stance on miracles deserves a response.
You cite Matthew 17:20 as evidence that Jesus was wrong about miracles (and therefore that He is not God). Here is the whole passage in context (from the New King James version):
14 And when they had come to the multitude, a man came to Him, kneeling down to Him and saying,
15 "Lord, have mercy on my son, for he is an epileptic and suffers severely; for he often falls into the fire and often into the water.
16 So I brought him to Your disciples, but they could not cure him."
17 Then Jesus answered and said, "O faithless and perverse generation, how long shall I be with you? How long shall I bear with you? Bring him here to Me."
18 And Jesus rebuked the demon, and it came out of him; and the child was cured from that very hour.
19 Then the disciples came to Jesus privately and said, "Why could we not cast it out?"
20 So Jesus said to them, "Because of your unbelief; for assuredly, I say to you, if you have faith as a mustard seed, you will say to this mountain, 'Move from here to there,' and it will move; and nothing will be impossible for you.
21 However, this kind does not go out except by prayer and fasting.
I'm not a theologian, so this will almost certainly be an incomplete answer. But it seems to me that the key to this passage is in verse 16. Yes, Jesus says that anyone with a modicum of faith can move mountains: but here even His own disciples lacked the necessary "mustard seed" of faith to get the job done. These were the first men ever to believe in Jesus as God; they had already ascribed miracles to Him; they believed that they had witnessed miracles first hand, and thus by any standard had far more empirical reason to be faithful than any of us might. For that matter, they were at that very moment attempting to perform a miracle, which suggests that they had some degree of confidence that they could do so.
If Jesus rebukes the faith of these men as being smaller than that of a mustard seed, this may give us a clue as to how high Jesus' standards for faith were, or how little faith even the most ardent believers might actually have. (As compared to other humans, a person might be said to have an ironclad faith; but that belief may nevertheless amount to a tiny fraction of the kind ("amount?") of faith that a perfect believer might have.) Recall also that most humans do not excel at self-knowledge.
In context, it seems that the bar for mustard seeds is fairly high. The disciples were in the middle of trying to perform a miracle at the time, which suggests that they thought they could do it. Jesus immediately told them that they lacked sufficient faith. We can conclude from this that He did not mean to say that everyone who thinks a miracle will happen is going to get their miracle.
It may also be (although we'd have to get into the etymology of the word used in the original language) that "faith" as used here is not synonymous with "belief." That's certainly true in English: "belief" implies a factual conviction; "faith" also implies both trust and steadfastness. (One is faithful to a person or a goal if they cleave to it unwaveringly; one has faith in someone if one trusts them.) I don't know which sense of the word "faith" Jesus meant. Possibly all of them.
According to Webster, "faith" means not only "belief in the traditional doctrines of a religion" or "complete trust", but also:
- "allegiance to duty or a person"
- "fidelity to one's promises"
- "sincerity of intentions"
The latter definition might be particularly apposite. The Bible is rife with stories of people trying to do the right thing for the wrong reasons and finding no favour with God. It may be that the kind of faith Jesus spoke of was not the simple belief that the miracle will occur, but such a belief held in complete sincerity of intention--i.e. with nothing but the will to effect God's purposes in the world. Very few of us could claim to be so free of our own egos and desires as to hold the kind of sincerity of intention that would meet the standards of a perfect God.
It's also unlikely that anyone possessing such a sincerity of intention would ask for anything too far outside the desires of God. Most of our petitions are far more selfish than that, or at least so simplistic as to fail to consider broader systemic concerns that might affect God's decisions about whether to intervene. In other words, by a standard definition of the word "faith," Jesus may be taken to mean that miracles will be granted at the request of those who believe when their requests accord with God's principles. It's not at all clear that Jesus was making an unqualified promise that we'll get whatever we ask for whenever we ask for it.
This is just my own interpretation of the text--I don't claim any special knowledge and haven't studied the question--but it's one possible answer. This is not grasping at straws; it's merely a matter of reading the section in context and digging into the meaning of the words.
Paul,
I'm afraid this discussion is getting us nowhere. So long as you are able to invoke the supernatural argument, then anything is possible. What is the evidence that the flood occurred? Or if there is none, do you contend that god made the evidence disappear? He could have, right?
This gets us nowhere. If you honestly believe that the flood is a piece of legitimate history, then we are much, much further apart then I originally thought.
The onus is on you to provide evidence that these things happened; that prayers can be answered, that the flood is history, that creation occurred according to the account in Genesis, and all of the other myriad ridiculous things that the bible contends.
I could replace the word "god" with the word "Odin" in all of your posts, and they would make just as much sense. You have no evidence for any of these claims; merely being "consistent with" or "not contradicted by" science does not evidence make. You should be able to provide real evidence that prayers can be answered; I've already outlined the experiment. You should be able to provide geological evidence for the flood (and evidence that a wooden boat would be seaworthy in a storm of that magnitude); that salt water fish could survive in a fresh water flood (or vice versa).
You provide none of this; you simply obfuscate behind the 'supernatural'; perhaps my peanut butter sandwich spoke to me this morning; if I invoke the supernatural, why is this any less ridiculous than what you're telling me?
I've enjoyed this, I really have. But when someone has not reasoned themselves into a position, it is impossible to reason them out of it. Until you're ready to provide a modicum of evidence; real honest evidence suggesting your version of all this is correct, I'm afraid we can go no further.
Mike,
I don't know that we're as far apart as you fear. I'm not saying that I don't need to provide evidence for the things I believe. I have a limited purpose here for arguing that you can't disprove claims of the supernatural: I'm simply rebutting your argument that anything which is not naturally possible must not have happened.
My invocation of the supernatural is not evidence that my God exists. I'm simply saying that your argument presupposes its conclusion.
I understand that you don't see any compelling evidence to believe in the supernatural, but I'm sure you understand that by definition, we wouldn't expect the supernatural to be repeatable and observable in the same way the natural is. You might validly say that you choose not to believe in anything until you can observe or demonstrate it--that's a perfectly valid intellectual position to take--but it's a big leap from there to the proposition that because the supernatural has not been observed or demonstrated scientifically, it does not exist. The reason that latter proposition is invalid is that it demands that the supernatural behave according to the "rules" of nature. And the reason you make that demand, I believe, is that you've already presupposed that nature is all there is.
You're right that my argument obviously doesn't demonstrate the existence of the supernatural. That's for another day. For the time being, I'm simply trying to show that my faith isn't contrary to logic or reason. Your arguments which attempt to show otherwise can only do so if they presume their conclusion.
I suppose we've been having two separate arguments: I'm not yet arguing for the truth of my position; I'm merely arguing that it hasn't been falsified. You're arguing that it hasn't been proven. To that extent, we may actually agree with each other.
Thoughts?
I have a limited purpose here for arguing that you can't disprove claims of the supernatural: I'm simply rebutting your argument that anything which is not naturally possible must not have happened.
And I have accepted that. But, the natural conclusion of that position is that ANYTHING is possible. You invent a being that cannot be seen, heard, touched, or smelled, but that can directly interact with the universe and influence the physical laws of nature. Fine. But why is existence of that being more plausible than the existence of any of the other infinite number of possible beings that could do the same thing? Moreover, why think this in the first place? And most importantly of all, why organize your life around it?
My point is not that these things cannot happen, but merely that the onus is on you to provide the evidence that they have. I still have not seen a single piece of positive evidence to suggest that your particular version of things is correct.
My invocation of the supernatural is not evidence that my God exists. I'm simply saying that your argument presupposes its conclusion.
And your conclusion, based on this, is that it is equally valid to hold a position of naturalism vs. allowing for the existence of the supernatural, which is simply wrong. For one thing, we have evidence that natural phenomenon exist. On the contrary, all we have for the supernatural is the lack of evidence that it does not exist, and that's not good enough.
I understand that you don't see any compelling evidence to believe in the supernatural, but I'm sure you understand that by definition, we wouldn't expect the supernatural to be repeatable and observable in the same way the natural is.
Why? I'm not going to let you simply redefine the rule of what is expected of the supernatural. The mechanisms of the supernatural may be foreign to us, but the effects should be repeatable. Why do you get to define the question, by fiat?
The reason that latter proposition is invalid is that it demands that the supernatural behave according to the "rules" of nature.
And you're defining the "rules" of the supernatural as you wish. There's the rub; the supernatural can be any old thing you want. I have to play by the rules of nature, which are observable to anyone. But you can have your flood and drink it too.
You're right that my argument obviously doesn't demonstrate the existence of the supernatural. That's for another day.
I think it's for today. If you have the evidence, let's see it. And consider that your evidence must suggest that your particular supernatural, and not some other particular, mutually incompatible supernatural, is reality.
I suppose we've been having two separate arguments: I'm not yet arguing for the truth of my position; I'm merely arguing that it hasn't been falsified. You're arguing that it hasn't been proven. To that extent, we may actually agree with each other.
And you are assuming that all that has not been falsified is true. It doesn't work like that.
Consider...
"The universe, and everything in it, was created, as we see it today, last Thursday at 5:07PM. All your memories of times prior to last Thursday were planted there to make it seem as though you have, in reality, been living on this planet for three decades."
Is is reasonable to believe that this is true? It cannot be falsified. But there is absolutely no evidence that it is true, and it is far more in keeping with the available evidence that the universe is closer to 17 billion years old, rather than just under a week old.
That's what we're dealing with here. We need not accept things without proper evidence.
Mike,
I hope I don't come across as being difficult. I haven't seriously addressed the evidence for my beliefs because we have a threshold issue to resolve first. Until we resolve it, we're unlikely to have a productive conversation.
If I understand you correctly, the only evidence you will accept is that which is repeatable and demonstrable. In other words, you will only accept evidence which is consistent with the laws of nature. Since we're asking whether the supernatural exists, this begs the question.
If I point to any evidence for God that is repeatable and demonstrable, you'll say that it is therefore natural and is thus no evidence of a supernatural God. If, on the other hand, I point to any evidence that is not repeatable and demonstrable, you'll say it is therefore untrue (or at least so unlikely as to be unworthy of serious consideration) and is thus no evidence of a supernatural God.
Do you see the position this puts us in? As long as you start from the proposition that only the natural is reasonably possible, you've presupposed your answer and cut yourself off from rational debate on the subject. We can't yet have a discussion about evidence for the supernatural, because you've implied that you will only accept evidence which confirms your hypothesis.
Hence my modest goal thus far: I'm not yet trying to prove God's existence. I'm simply trying to establish that we can't rule out the supernatural, and that we can't use solely natural criteria to assess the likelihood of its existence. If we can agree on that, then we can discuss whether there is any compelling reason to believe in the supernatural in general, or God (as I understand Him) in particular.
"God" and "supernatural" are loaded terms. Leaving them aside, let me pose a problem:
We all agree that items in the world tend to behave in predictable, repeatable ways. Given the same circumstances, cause A will always produce result B. We call these patterns the laws of nature. (As a doctor of science, you of course know this far better than I.)
Suppose we want to know whether these patterns ever fail to apply--that is, whether there are ever exceptions to the laws of nature. We know that under controlled circumstances, cause A predictably leads to result B. Does it ever, perhaps even just once, lead to result X instead?
How would we seek an answer to this question?
We can't resort to inductive reasoning. We know from observation that every time we try, cause A produces result B. This establishes a pattern. But we want to know whether that pattern has ever broken down. Looking at the pattern does not prove that there are no exceptions whatsoever. It just means that we don't know of any. The question is whether there can ever be even one exception. Generalizing from our experience cannot answer that question.
Nor can we resort to deductive reasoning, unless we have some a priori knowledge from which we can deduce that the laws of nature apply without exception. We have no such knowledge, since our entire understanding of nature is empirical and thus inductive.
We can't reject the proposition out of hand as being implausible--not if we take the question seriously. "Implausible" in this instance simply means statistically unlikely. But we're asking whether a deviation from the laws of nature might occur exceedingly rarely. Everyone concedes that such an occurrence might be so rare as to be statistically unlikely; that doesn't make it impossible.
So how would an inquisitive person seek an answer? The only method I can think of would be to consult anecdotal evidence.
Assuming we find some anecdotal evidence, the best we can do is to assess its credibility. Is it corroborated? Is the reporter suffering from some bias or cognitive deficit? If corroborated, were all the witnesses suffering from the same deficit simultaneously?
Note that it's not legitimate to assess credibility by referring to the normal laws of nature and saying that it is therefore unlikely that any aberration occurred. The question is whether deviations from the normal laws ever occur. We can't point to the laws themselves as proof that there are never any deviations. The moment we do, we've begged the question.
If we take the question seriously, then, we must be prepared to look at anecdotal evidence and judge its credibility, and we cannot use the laws of nature in doing so.
In my view, that is a necessary precondition for a valid discussion of the question. I sense that we haven't gotten there yet. Do you agree?
Paul,
I'm willing to accept your premise; there is no question that we cannot disprove the existence of the supernatural using natural means. I think we need to move past this point; it will bog this discussion down. Science does not allow for the existence of the supernatural; end of story.
However, will you not also concede that acceptance of the existence of the supernatural means that we must accept the possibility of anything and everything? If Jesus can walk on water, or god can flood the earth, then Poseidon can rule the oceans, Ra can control the sun, and Mohammed can ascend to heaven on a winged horse. How are we to differentiate between these supernatural entities?
Assume, as Sam Harris has posited, that the world were to wake up tomorrow having lost all knowledge of past history, and had only to learn based on the books in our libraries. In those libraries, we would find books describing our various myths. We would read of Jesus, Mohammed, Zeus, Ra, Odin, Thor, Poseidon, and the rest. What would cause us to assume one of these mutually incompatible stories is correct and the others are not? Indeed, what would cause us to believe that any of them are correct, in the absence of any corroborating evidence from our surroundings? And, most importantly, if we can imagine, in this hypothetical scenario, excluding all of them based on the total lack of evidence suggesting one is correct over all others, why can we not exclude them now?
I really think we need to move past this issue. I accept that the supernatural cannot be falsified using natural means. But this does not mean we have to accept all ridiculous notions. And, to be frank, I believe that the notion that Jesus was born of a virgin, walked on water, performed miracles, was crucified and resurrected, and now sits at the right hand of god to judge the dead, is ridiculous; there is no reason to believe it, except that it says these things are true in a book.
You describe anecdotes of certain events that are not inconsistent with what the bible describes, or at least can be coaxed into fitting the bible. First, I would simply reiterate the old moniker "the plural of 'anecdote' is not 'evidence'", and second, I would point out that most Muslims can describe numerous events that are not inconsistent with what the koran describes, or at least can be coaxed into fitting the koran.
Paul,
Today is Friday June 13; a very unlucky day, of course.
While there is, of course, no natural evidence that Friday the 13th is unlucky, we should, of course, recognize that any possible evidence for this would be outside of the "natural", yes?
Sure, there's no evidence that suggests that there is a preponderance of bad luck on Friday the 13th vs other days, but then that's not what we'd expect from a phenomenon that occurs using supernatural means; by definition, we can't evaluate the badluckitude of Friday the 13th using natural science.
Once I'm done with this scientific conference I'm at (chock full of studies that, while evidence based, are totally missing out on the potential impact of the supernatural), I'm going to get some homeopathic treatments for this sore finger I have. Sure, there's no evidence that homeopathy actually works, but then again all of the studies showing absolutely no effect of active substances diluted 100 billion fold are likely biased since they do not include the possible role of the supernatural.
In fact, it's unlikely that my finger is sore at all; sure, there's evidence of it: the swelling, the pain, the increased blood flow. But that ignores the possibility that this is merely a supernatural effect and that, in reality, my finger is just fine.
I'm really beginning to like this supernatural thing. Things are becoming so much clearer now that I've accepted that anything is possible AND likely.
I'm willing to accept your premise; there is no question that we cannot disprove the existence of the supernatural using natural means. I think we need to move past this point; it will bog this discussion down. Science does not allow for the existence of the supernatural; end of story.
Mike, I'm not sure I understand you here. You concede that science cannot disprove the existence of the supernatural, but you claim that "science does not allow for the existence of the supernatural." Are you not flatly contradicting yourself?
If what you mean is that the question of the supernatural is beyond the purview of science, then I agree with you. But if you mean that science has ruled out the supernatural, then you've contradicted yourself.
I don't think this issue bogs our discussion down: we need to resolve it before we can move on. You rightly challenge me to produce evidence for my beliefs, and we'll get there. To have a productive discussion on the evidence, we must first agree on the kinds of evidence that will be relevant to the issue, and the ways we can judge the validity of that evidence. It seems to me that you insist on the scientific method as the only valid means of weighing the evidence. Since we seem to agree that the question--not just my answer to the question, but the question itself--is fundamentally unscientific, we're not going to get anywhere if you require scientific answers to an unscientific question. So we need to find valid means of assessing probative value before it will be worthwhile to discuss the evidence.
Jumping ahead a bit: your arguments on superstition (i.e. Friday the 13th), alternative medicine, and mythology are well taken. But there is no need to fear that once we accept the possibility of the supernatural, we open the floodgates to accepting every supernatural claim ever made. Nor do we have to accept, as you suggest, that the possibility of the supernatural means that every unnatural explanation is both possible and likely. If we have a complete natural explanation for a phenomenon, chances are it's a natural phenomenon. If, on the other hand, we have a phenomenon that can't be explained naturally, there are a few possibilities:
1) The observer was hallucinating and the phenomenon didn't actually happen.
2) The phenomenon may eventually be explained by reference to natural processes that we have yet to observe and describe.
3) The phenomenon was not natural but supernatural.
I'm not saying #3 is always (or even often) a likely explanation. I'm simply saying that we can't rule it out, and--by operation of sheer logic--we can't use naturalism as a means of doing so.
The three "floodgates" examples you give--superstition, alternative medicine and mythology--can be distinguished from Christianity.
Regarding superstition: people claim that Friday the 13th is a supernaturally unlucky day. The inability to scientifically disprove the supernatural does not mean that we have to accept this claim. Here's why: the superstition actually consists of two claims. The first is that significantly more unfortunate events happen on Friday the 13th than on other days. The second claim is that the reason for the increase is supernatural. In other words, the superstition includes one claim about results (the number of unfortunate events) and one claim about causes.
Assuming a fixed definition of "unfortunate events", we can test the first claim by studying whether there actually is an increase in such events on Friday the 13th. If there isn't, we can reject the superstition.
If we have evidence that significantly more unfortunate events occur on Friday the 13th, we can investigate the causes. (This step is only necessary if we've established that there is, in fact, an increase in unfortunate events.) Because we can't disprove the existence of the supernatural, we can't rule it out as a possible cause. If, however, there is evidence of natural causes that would adequately explain the occurrences (and the timing of their increase), we might reasonably prefer the natural explanation.
Alternative medicine is an easier case. To my knowledge, most forms of alternative medicine claim to operate by natural and repeatable means, and should thus be subject to scientific falsification.
As for mythology, it comes down to the question you've asked: what's the evidence? I'm not certain that anyone ever claimed to have personally encountered (say) Zeus. I don't think there has ever been a personal, first-hand, eyewitness account of a meeting with a Norse god. We have corroborated first-hand accounts of meetings with Jesus in which He is said to have performed miraculous feats. As I've said before, we can debate the probative value of the evidence--which we'll do as soon as we can agree on a valid standard of evaluation--but there is some evidence. Deductive reasoning may also count for something, assuming we agree on valid first principles.
So we can distinguish ancient myth from religion on grounds other than simple antiquity. Myths have no evidence going for them, whereas some (perhaps all?) religions have evidence in the form of putative eyewitness accounts.
Choosing amongst religions is a more difficult task. The quality of the evidence for each comes into play. So do philosophy and theology: if you accept that one of them might be true, it may be fair to choose between them deductively (again assuming that you begin with a valid set of first principles). It's worth noting that there aren't nearly as many options as you might think: Christianity, Judaism and Islam are all varying descriptions of the same God. When choosing between them, one needn't establish that the other two are entirely false: only the irreconcilable differences between them are relevant.
Likewise, Hinduism has its own offshoots. The Abrahamic religions (on one hand) and the Hindu faith and its derivations (on the other) account for nearly all the theistic religions in the world, so the choices are not as overwhelming as one might think. In any event, we can't conclude that simply because there may be a great many possible answers, none of them is likely to be true. We might conclude that the higher the number of possible religions, the less likely it is that any one religion is true to the total exclusion of all others, but that's not what we're faced with. There's a fair amount of overlap between them; as I said above, only the irreconcilable differences are relevant when choosing between them.
But now we're getting into the evidence, which I still don't think we're equipped to do until we've settled that threshold issue. Are we agreed that we can't discredit claims of supernatural occurrences on the basis that they're unnatural, and that to do so would beg the question?
If what you mean is that the question of the supernatural is beyond the purview of science, then I agree with you.
That is what I mean. Science does not disprove the supernatural; it merely ignores it.
To have a productive discussion on the evidence, we must first agree on the kinds of evidence that will be relevant to the issue, and the ways we can judge the validity of that evidence.
I agree; we must come to some common ground with respect to what constitutes evidence.
Since we seem to agree that the question--not just my answer to the question, but the question itself--is fundamentally unscientific, we're not going to get anywhere if you require scientific answers to an unscientific question.
I disgaree profoundly here, Paul. The question is not unscientific. God either exists or does not exist; it is a question with a real answer. You have made the claim that the evidence for the claim that god exists cannot be found using natural means, which is very convenient. I have allowed for your point that science does not concern itself with the supernatural, but that should in no way be taken as my admission that the supernatural exists, only that if the supernatural exists, it cannot, at present, be detected using scientific means. The techniques may be unscientific, but the question is very much scientific.
Nor do we have to accept, as you suggest, that the possibility of the supernatural means that every unnatural explanation is both possible and likely. If we have a complete natural explanation for a phenomenon, chances are it's a natural phenomenon. If, on the other hand, we have a phenomenon that can't be explained naturally, there are a few possibilities:
I see the god-of-the-gaps approaching swiftly.
1) The observer was hallucinating and the phenomenon didn't actually happen.
2) The phenomenon may eventually be explained by reference to natural processes that we have yet to observe and describe.
3) The phenomenon was not natural but supernatural.
Ok, I'm going to concede this point to you. Now, let's take a count of all of the things that were, at one point, attributed to god or gods. Earthquakes? Yup. The rise and fall of the sun? Ditto. Tides? Uh-huh. The list goes on and on.
Indeed, the diversity of the living world was, until very recently, attributed to god.
All of these things are now known to function through completely rational, natural processes, which have well-described mechanisms.
In other words, number 2 on your checklist has won every time. I'm still waiting on a good reason to believe that (a) number 3 is a possibility, (b) the source of the supernatural power is god, and (c) the god in question is the god of the OT and the NT.
The first is that significantly more unfortunate events happen on Friday the 13th than on other days. The second claim is that the reason for the increase is supernatural. In other words, the superstition includes one claim about results (the number of unfortunate events) and one claim about causes.
Couldn't agree with you more, Paul. We CAN evaluate the claims of the unluckiness of Friday the 13th or the benefits of homeopathy, because determining IF they work is a distinct question from HOW they work. All of the good data suggests the Friday the 13th is not unlucky, and homeopathy is a fraud which does no better than placebo.
But you have exempted Christianity (but not other faiths) from this standard. Christianity makes claims about reality which can be tested; prayers are answered, Pi = 3, the universe and everything in it were created in 6 days, the earth was once covered up to "all the high mountains" in water, human beings lived to be hundreds of years old.
All of these things (and particularly the flood) can be analysed on two levels: are they true and, if so, how are they true. You assume they are, and then invoke the supernatural to get around the aspects of these questions that are inconveniently opposed by what your intellect tells you is impossible. A worldwide flood would have left demonstrable evidence of having occurred. Nevermind HOW it happened; where is the evidence that it DID happen?
Nevermind HOW a particular god created the Earth in 6 days, what is the evidence that this HAS happened?
Nevermind HOW people lived to be hundreds of years old, what is the evidence that they DID?
Even answered prayer, which may function by supernatural means, can be analysed as such; we may need to invoke the supernatural to explain it, but Jesus makes it very clear that prayer WILL work for the truly faithful. This question is, therefore, really testable.
The mechanisms of all of these things may be outside of our grasp, but the existence of the phenomena is not, in the same way as Friday the 13th and homeopathy are not.
Alternative medicine is an easier case. To my knowledge, most forms of alternative medicine claim to operate by natural and repeatable means, and should thus be subject to scientific falsification.
Not homeopathy. Homeopathy operates on two core principles, neither of which is scientific. The first is that "like cures like", which is sufficiently vague, but certainly not in line with the observation that E. Coli infections are not readily treated with introduction of S. Aureus.
The second principle is that water has "memory" and that an active ingredient can be put into water, be diluted billions of fold (so there is not so much as a single molecule of the original substance in the water), and the water retains healing power. In fact, a related tenet is that the greater the dilution, the greater the effect.
These mechanisms are absolutely contrary to known physics, chemistry, and biology. If even a single one of these things were true, it would open a huge new avenue of research, and would yield Nobel Prizes for the next 50 years.
But it's not even necessary to do the mechanistic studies: homeopathy doesn't work. End of story.
Moreover, this misses my key point; if I allow for the supernatural, why can I not say that my finger does not, in reality, hurt, but is actually just fine, and the supposed pain is simply the result of gremlins infecting my nervous system?
In fact, I'm actually right now sitting on a beach in Maui, but leprechauns have infected my retinas and make me think I'm sitting here at work.
The point is not that there are or are not (putative) natural mechanisms for these things, but that if we allow for the supernatural, then even the natural world is phony; gravity isn't real, it just seems real because of the fairy at the bottom of the garden. Do you see how this leads to a completely untenable reality?
As for mythology, it comes down to the question you've asked: what's the evidence? I'm not certain that anyone ever claimed to have personally encountered (say) Zeus.
This happens often in 'The Iliad', for instance. Encounters with other classical gods is not uncommon. Heck, Zeus even fathered a child with a mortal (producing Heracles).
We have corroborated first-hand accounts of meetings with Jesus in which He is said to have performed miraculous feats. As I've said before, we can debate the probative value of the evidence--which we'll do as soon as we can agree on a valid standard of evaluation--but there is some evidence.
Personal encounters with god are not at all uncommon in virtually all faiths that have ever existed.
Anyway, personal encounters with god simply beg the question; if there is no god to have an encounter with, then no encounter is possible. There has to be external evidence.
Once again, the plural of 'anecdote' is not 'evidence'.
So we can distinguish ancient myth from religion on grounds other than simple antiquity. Myths have no evidence going for them, whereas some (perhaps all?) religions have evidence in the form of putative eyewitness accounts.
I'm afraid that this is as far as the discussion will go; you put a great deal of emphasis on personal experience (which is not surprising, given your acceptance of a personal god), and I do not.
Mohammed had a personal encounter with Gabriel, and this is well-documented in the koran and the hadith. Billions of muslims believe the literal truth of this. Islamic teachings specifically state that Jesus is not god and that those who do not accept Allah are destined for the very worst punishment imaginable. Yet you and I don't lose a minute's sleep worrying about this; we both reject Islam, and for the same reason. Neither of us see enough evidence to believe it is true; we use the same standard of evidence here. However, your incredulity does not extend so far as Christianity, whereas I see no difference.
But now we're getting into the evidence, which I still don't think we're equipped to do until we've settled that threshold issue. Are we agreed that we can't discredit claims of supernatural occurrences on the basis that they're unnatural, and that to do so would beg the question?
Yes. But our standard of evidence must be set a priori. We cannot be allowed to reach a point of contention, and then have it explained away by "the supernatural". That is to say, there must be limits to what the supernatural is capable of. Otherwise, yet again, you get to have your flood and drink it to. You can invoke the natural when it suits you, and haul out god when necessary. If this is to be the case, if we cannot set boundaries on what the supernatural can and cannot do, then this discussion is moot; you cannot lose.
However, I fully admit that the scientific method does not allow for supernatural interventions; they are not a part of science.
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